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During the Second World War, the women employed in Britain's secret Security Service (MI5) far 
outnumbered their male colleagues, with a ratio of twelve women for every five men. Their 
numbers grew rapidly over the course of the war and by 1941 stood at over 800. Despite the vast 
influx of female labour into the agency, attitudes towards the role of women in intelligence, be it as 
wartime workers or as secret agents, demonstrated remarkable continuity with those of the interwar 
period. Women were near universally restricted to subordinate roles; typically of clerical and 
secretarial nature in the case of office staff. Similarly, internal attitudes regarding those traits which 
produced the best agents and intelligence officers, shaped by wider understandings of both 
masculinity and social status, demonstrated considerable resilience. Drawing upon declassified 
official records, this article argues that MI5’s wartime experiences did little to alter the agency's 
attitudes to gender. 
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On 18 November 1940, Jane Archer (nee Sissmore) the main expert on Soviet espionage for 
the Security Service, MI5, was ignominiously sacked. Invited to give 'frank criticism' to the acting 
Director General of the agency, (Oswald Allen 'Jasper' Harker), the officer made the dangerous error 
of doing precisely that. Guy Liddell, the Director of B Division, MI5's counter-espionage section, 
wrote in his diaries that Archer had been dismissed for insubordination and that it was 'a very 
serious blow to us all'. Liddell added that she was 'completely on the wrong leg', but also noted that  
'the incident should not have happened' and pondered what he might to do resolve the sorry state of 
affairs and rescue Archer. Ultimately, though Archer tendered an apology, supplemented with 
appeals on her behalf from Liddell to David Petrie (the only other figure sufficiently senior to 
challenge Harker), efforts to rescue the situation came to nought. Any challenge to the authority of 
the Director General's decision would have required Liddell’s resignation – too high a price to pay.1  
 
Thus (temporarily) ended the MI5 career of Jane Archer, one of only a handful of female 
intelligence officers employed by the agency at that time. Not even her exemplary record and long 
service could save her. These achievements included the interrogation of the Soviet spy Walter 
Krivitsky, described by the official historian of MI5 as a 'model of its kind'. That same historian, 
Christopher Andrew, further notes that some evidence even suggests that after this episode, the 
agency adopted a policy which would prevent the further promotion of women to officer status.2 Of 
course, that a woman was dismissed for challenging the authority of her male superior in wartime 
Britain is hardly surprising and that there were already few female officers in MI5 is even less so.  
However, over the course of the war, that situation began to change. While it has long been 
acknowledged that women played a role in MI5, typically as clerical staff, during the Second World 
War at least some women were to hold officer status (though not necessarily rank) within the 
confines of auxiliary roles. This article aims to outline the number of women working within MI5 
and their function in the organisation, explore the gendered culture of the agency, and to place this 
secret organisation within the wider social context of wartime Britain. It demonstrates that from the 
foundation of the professionalised intelligence community in 1909 to the end of the Second World War, 
despite a massive expansion in the size of the female work force, MI5s perception and recruitment of women 
was marked by considerable continuity of attitude regarding the inappropriateness of women to operate at 
                                                 
1 Guy Liddell (2005) 18-21 November 1940, in Nigel West (Ed.) The Guy Liddell Diaries, volume I: 1939-1942: M.I.5’s 
Director of Counter-Espionage in World War II (Abingdon: Routledge: Abingdon) p. 112. 
2 Christopher Andrew (2010) The Defence of the Realm: the authorised history of MI5 (London, Penguin), p. 220. 
senior levels within the agency. This is not only an interesting insight into the culture of Britain's 
intelligence services, but is also a reflection of the continuity in attitudes towards women in wartime 
Britain more generally in the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
Although there has been considerable interest in the world and history of spies and espionage, 
remarkably little scholarly investigation regarding the role of women in these agencies has been 
undertaken. Typically depicted as a male realm in popular culture, women, when present at all, are 
often awarded the role of the femme fatale.3 For instance, in the ubiquitous James Bond franchise, 
women in the intelligence services tend to occupy two roles: as objects of sexual desire or 
secretaries, and in the case of Miss Moneypenny – both. In George Smiley's rather darker world of 
lies, secrets and cigarette smoke, women are largely absent from ‘the Circus’ (the name given by Le 
Carré to the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6). The major exception is Connie Sachs, a figure 
reminiscent in some ways of Jane Archer. Like Archer she was an expert on Soviet espionage and, 
again like Archer, lost her job when she fell victim to agency politics. However, where the fictional 
Sachs descended into a world of alcoholism, Archer's position was restored in 1946 following the 
departure of both Harker and Petrie. This marginalisation of women, in spy fiction and film, dates to 
the beginning of the twentieth century, which placed central emphasis on the gentleman spy, who, in 
fact, closely resembled the actual spies of the early British professional intelligence community.4  
 
Professional historians, not least of whom, Christopher Andrew, the official historian of MI6 
Keith Jeffrey, Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas, have presented rather more nuanced visions 
of the position of women in these agencies.5 Nevertheless, their interest has still primarily revolved 
around the wider structures and operational activities of these agencies with women’s contributions 
regarded as a peripheral concern. This omission, in some respects, might be explained by the fact 
that women are highly under-represented in intelligence studies, as Damien Van Puyvelde and Sean 
Curtis have recently shown.6  
 
                                                 
3 Juliette Pattinson (2016) The Twilight War: Gender and Espionage, Britain 1900-1950, in Simona Sharoni, Julia 
Welland, Linda Steiner, Jennifer Pedersen (Eds), Handbook on War and Gender (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing), p. 66. 
4 Ibid, pp. 66-70. 
5 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm; Keith Jeffrey (2010) MI6: the history of the secret intelligence service, 1909-1949 
(London: Bloomsbury); Thomas Hennessy & Claire Thomas (2009) Spooks: the unofficial history of MI5 (Gloucester: 
Amberley). 
6 Indeed, Van Puyvelde and Curtis' concerns regarding the field of intelligence have followed earlier interventions, not 
least by Richard Aldrich and John Kasuku, which have emphasised a similar point. Damien Van Puyvelde and Sean 
Curtis (2016) Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: diversity and scholarship in Intelligence Studies, Intelligence and 
National Security, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1185323; Richard Aldrich & John Kasuku, Standing on the 
shoulders of giants’: diversity and scholarship in Intelligence Studies, Intelligence and National Security, 88(5), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1185323. 
Of course, though scholarly interest in women and gender in the history of intelligence is 
limited, it is not entirely absent. In the context of Britain's secret world, Tammy Proctor's work on 
female spies in the First World War represents an important intervention, as does Juliette Pattinson's 
analysis of female agents in the Special Operations Executive.7 However, the greatest headway in 
exploring the role of women in Britain's intelligence services during the Second World War has 
come from popular writers and historians, as opposed to their colleagues in the academy. The work 
of women at Bletchley Park, in particular, has become far better known and understood in recent 
years.8 Nevertheless, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) which was head-
quartered at Bletchley Park during the Second World War, is just one facet of Britain's intelligence 
community. As Pattinson has recently noted, in studies of intelligence 'women are rarely afforded 
much attention'.9 The primary objective of this article, therefore, is to begin to remedy this situation 
and fill the lacuna in the field as it pertains to the role and place of women in MI5 during the 
Second World War.  
 
In addition to shedding light on the role of gender in MI5, an analysis of the role of women in 
wartime intelligence work also provides an opportunity to revisit a protracted debate in the 
historiography of the Second World War concerning the long contested influence of the wartime 
emergency on the role and status of women in Britain. More generally, as Geoffrey G. Field notes in 
his recent major analysis of the British working classes in the Second World War, the central 
question 'what difference did the war make?' has been at the heart of 'just about every major study' 
of the war since the publication of Richard Titmuss' seminal 1950 study Problems of Social 
Policy.10 Titmuss, of course, argued that the war did indeed have an impact on the development of 
British society and that it was profound.11 Ultimately, Field himself agreed that the war did have a 
'major role in shaping Britain's social and political development.'12 Without rehearsing the familiar 
development of this historiography, it is worth reflecting on Sonya Rose's conclusion that the 
national 'pull to unity was haunted by the spectre of division and difference'.13 MI5, in many 
                                                 
7 Tammy M. Proctor (2005) Female Intelligence: women and espionage in the First World War, (New York, NY: New 
York University); Juliette Pattinson (2007) Behind Enemy Lines: gender, passing and the Special Operations Executive 
in the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
8 Tessa Dunlop (2015) The Bletchley Girls: war, secrecy, love and loss: the women of Bletchley Park tell their story 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton); Michael Smith, The Debs of Bletchley Park and other stories (London: Aurum Press). 
For academic treatments of this topic see: Christopher Smith (2014) Operating Secret Machines: military women and 
the intelligence production line, 1939-1945, Women's History Magazine, 76; Christopher Smith (2015) The Hidden 
History of Bletchley Park: a social and organisational history (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).  
9 Pattinson, The twilight war: gender and espionage, Britain 1900-1950, p. 67. 
10 Geoffrey G. Field (2011) Blood, Sweat and Toil: remaking the British working class, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p. 373. 
11 Richard Titmuss (1950), Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO). 
12 Field, Blood, Sweat and Toil, pp. 373-374. 
13 Sonya Rose (2003) Which People's War?: national identity and citizenship in wartime Britain 1939-1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p. 286. 
respects, showcases the various contradictions in British society that have produced this complex 
and diverse historiography. Moreover, MI5 is a particularly interesting laboratory to test these kinds 
of question because of the added complicating factor of extreme secrecy, which was, of course, a 
ubiquitous concern for the agency and one taken to near unique levels in the already security 
conscious wartime Britain. The result was an organisation dominated by conservative perceptions of 
femininity and the role of women in a society that cherished the concept of gentlemanly 
masculinity, and which was also deeply suspicious of alien behaviour – a reflection of its very 
purpose. Overall, the masculine culture of the agency was remarkably resilient, yet on the other 
hand, the war did produce some perceptible qualified changes, particularly in terms of the vast 
numerical expansion of its staff – most of whom were women. The result was some, highly limited, 
opportunity for the advancement through the ranks of female employees to positions of 
responsibility. Before embarking on an analysis of MI5 during the Second World War, however, it is 
worth briefly exploring the development of the agency from its foundations in 1909. 
 
War and Peace, 1909-1939 
 
The modern day British intelligence apparatus of organisations was created in 1909 with the 
founding of the Secret Service Bureau, an institution created by the Committee of Imperial Defence 
to fulfil a tripartite central mandate. These objectives were: first, 'to serve as a screen between the 
Admiralty and War Office and foreign spies'; second, 'to send agents to various parts of Great 
Britain… with a view to ascertaining the nature and scope of the espionage that is being carried on 
by foreign agents; and third, 'to act as an intermediate agent between the Admiralty and the War 
Office and a permanent foreign agent who should be established abroad, with the view of obtaining 
information in foreign countries.'14 The bureau comprised of two branches; a home branch (H 
Branch), concerned with espionage within Great Britain and its colonies (MI5), and a foreign 
branch (F Branch), concerned with investigative espionage abroad (MI6).15  
 
Meanwhile, the Admiralty and War Office both retained cryptanalytic departments tasked 
with reading the messages of foreign powers. In 1919, these two respective departments were 
merged to form GC&CS. The result was that at the beginning of the interwar period, the basic three-
agency arrangement of Britain's intelligence services had emerged. These agencies were not unique 
in that they worked in secret or dealt with the production and dissemination of sometimes 
                                                 
14 Conclusions of the Sub-Committee Requested to Consider How a Secret Service Bureau Could Be Established in 
Great Britain, in B. F. Smith (2008) The Birth of S.I.S: A Newly Released Document, Intelligence and National 
Security, 13(2), p. 185. 
15 Michael S. Goodman (2014) The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: volume I: from the approach of 
the Second World War to the Suez crisis (Oxford: Routledge), p. 12. 
clandestine information. Other secret organisations were also to emerge during the Second World 
War, not least the Special Operations Executive (SOE) which conducted acts of sabotage in 
occupied Europe, and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) which was engaged with the 
production and dissemination of black propaganda. Meanwhile, the service ministries in Whitehall, 
the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry, operated their own intelligence departments. 
 
From the point of its creation in 1909, both branches of the Secret Service Bureau held a 
highly traditional gendered perspective when it came to recruitment and the allocation of work. 
Desirable male qualities included patriotism, assertiveness and loyalty, and recruits were required to 
demonstrate these popular preconceived masculine traits. Furthermore, respectable social 
connections, a military background, a good education and a quality family pedigree were all 
obligatory. Meanwhile, the intelligence community believed that women were ultimately incapable 
of performing intelligence work effectively thanks to widespread cultural assumptions concerning 
women’s inability to command their emotions. In addition, feminine loyalties were regarded as too 
personal to be useful in espionage; as Tammy Proctor notes, 'it was inconceivable… that respectable 
women would betray their families for reasons of national or political ideologies.'16 These innate 
preconceptions regarding gender differences in loyalty to one’s country and the particular model in 
mind when trawling for recruits for intelligence work mean that women were invariably 
investigated far more thoroughly.17  
 
Primary emphasis was placed on nationality, class, education and military experience. For 
instance, the Sub-Committee assigned to form the Bureau advised that the leaders of the new 
organisation should be retired army and naval officers with a knowledge of foreign languages, as 
they would be best positioned to advise the War Office and Admiralty.18 The two men in question 
were Major (later Colonel Sir) Vernon Kell and Captain Mansfield Smith Cumming whose 
appointments also demonstrated the importance of social pedigree as a key factor. Kell had a 
military education from Sandhurst, had been an interpreter for the army, was in possession of 
personal wealth, and had aristocratic family connections. Similarly, Cumming, who had had a 
military education at Dartmouth and spoke French, had personal wealth and was married to a 
Scottish heiress.19 Once established, these recruitment trends continued throughout the pre-war 
                                                 
16 Tammy M. Proctor (2005) Family Ties in the Making of Modern Intelligence, The Journal of Social History, 39(2), p. 
455. 
17 Ibid, pp. 452-455. 
18 Conclusions of the Sub-Committee Requested to Consider How a Secret Service Bureau Could Be Established in 
Great Britain, p. 186. 
19 Proctor, Family Ties in the Making of Modern Intelligence, p. 453. 
years.20  
 
However, even in this embryonic phase, women were already present within the intelligence 
community. The first woman to join H Branch was, in fact, only the third individual to be recruited. 
Initially, H Branch was a lone operation staffed by Kell until, in 1910, he was provided with the 
service of a confidential clerk. As it happened the clerk had a daughter who was brought aboard the 
fledgling service to work as a typist.21 Before long, a further three women had been engaged as 
secretaries and by the outbreak of the First World War, H Branch employed 'five [male] officers, 
three male clerks', who were supported by, 'three [female] secretaries and a [female] typist'.22  
Although these women performed solely clerical roles, they were required to have 
recommendations from the head of their school or university, or through family connections.23 This, 
of course, reflected the wider attitudes and values of the civil service, which, on the one hand, 
valued meritocracy yet, on the other,  operated an 'elite-preserving system of recruitment'.24  
 
From the outset there was an unsurprising division of labour along gendered lines. Male 
officers performed the business of collecting and analysing intelligence, administrative duties were 
performed by male clerks, and secretarial work and typing was carried out by women. One 
department, the Registry, founded to collate data on ‘enemy aliens’ derived from the 1911 census 
and the police, became the central repository for information on suspects.25 This section was staffed 
exclusively by women.26 In 1920, MI5 produced a secret, anonymously authored, document 
detailing the history of female employment within the agency before and during the First World 
War. Interestingly, it was entitled 'Report on the Work of Women in MI5 of the Military Intelligence 
Directorate' on the third page of the document. However, the file itself was labelled slightly 
differently, denoting that it was a 'Report on Woman's [sic] Work'.27 Though highly complimentary 
about its female employees, the vast majority of whom were engaged in the same types of clerical 
and auxiliary work conducted by MI5's first four female staff members, the association of this form 
of labour as women's work offers a meaningful insight into attitudes of the author.   
 
The outbreak of the First World War necessitated a significant increase in female staff within 
                                                 
20 Ibid, p. 454. 
21 T[he] N[ational] A[rchive], KV 1/50, ‘H’ Branch Report. Organisation and Administration 1920: First Supplement on 
Woman’s Work, p. 10. Unfortunately, this first female employee was left anonymous.  
22 Ibid, p. 11. 
23 Proctor, Family Ties in the Making of Modern Intelligence, p. 455 
24 Jon Agar (2003) The Government Machine: a revolutionary history of the computer (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press), 
p. 191. 
25 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 48, p. 58. 
26 TNA, KV 1/50, p. 13. 
27 Ibid.  
H Branch as the volume of ‘women's work’ increased rapidly. By the end of the war, the agency's 
staff included 296 women and over its course had employed in excess of 650.28 As a result, female 
personnel outnumbered men in MI5, staffing the Registry entirely.29 Despite being large in number, 
these women were carefully selected, as the 1920 report on women's employment explained: 
 
…the qualifications which M.I.5 required in its women clerks and secretaries were 
intelligence, diligence and, above all, reticence. From the earliest days therefore, M.I.5 
sought its clerks in the ranks of educated women, who should naturally be supposed to have 
inherited a code of honour, that is to say the women staff of M.I.5 consisted of gentlewomen 
who had enjoyed a good school, and in some cases a University education.30  
 
During the First World War, Oxford and the London colleges were trawled for female recruits. 
However, as Christopher Andrew points out, this emphasis on the importance of a higher education 
did not extend to male recruits who were not required to have a university background until after 
the Second World War.31 Despite their first class education, women were nevertheless restricted to 
clerical roles.32 However, an exception to this was made for Miss A. W. Masterton who, although 
she was not given officer rank, became the first female financial controller in any government 
department, a direct reflection of her considerable competency.33 Apparently registering surprise 
that a female secretary was capable of performing such high quality accountancy, the 1920 report on 
women's work in MI5 concluded that the promotion of Miss Masterton was a 'very interesting 
episode'.34 The report went on to discuss the respective characteristics held by men and women 
which largely predetermined their places within H Branch. One female clerk was successful 
because 'she was equipped’ for the work by her 'peculiarly feminine characteristics, intuition and 
love of detail. By the possession of these two faculties she was a more efficient instrument for the 
work than the majority of men.' Men, the report added, 'as a rule neither have the patience, the 
interest in meticulous and tiresome detail, nor the intuition.' Masculine qualities, on the other hand, 
which the anonymous author believed to be possessed by only a few women in H Branch, included 
the 'power of organisation and decision and broad methods of work'. Of course, such work would 
not have been conducted by male officers anyway, but by male clerks. However, clerks were 
considered unfit for the job because they possessed 'lower social standing and fewer educational 
                                                 
28 Ibid, p. 18, p. 8. 
29 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 59. 
30 TNA, KV 1/50, p. 26. 
31 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, pp. 59-60. 
32 Ibid, p. 60. 
33 Ibid, p. 127. 
34 TNA, KV 1/50, p. 19. 
advantages', highlighting the acute prejudices within the agency surrounding social class as well as 
gender.35 
 
 After the First World War, MI5 was subjected to significant cutbacks and the majority of 
female staff recruited during wartime were dismissed.36 Retrenchment continued throughout the 
1920s and 1930s.37 By 1929, with the reduction of internal divisions, women constituted two of the 
four A Division (which dealt with administration) section heads, but the role of female staff had 
changed little, and neither of these female section heads were allocated officer status.38 Men, on the 
other hand, continued to enjoy superior roles and, just as in 1909, the traits of gentlemanly 
masculinity remained important, as the appointment of Major W. A. Phillips to the head of A 
Division in 1929 demonstrates. Phillips possessed a strong military background; he fought on the 
Western Front during the First World War and received an OBE for his work as a Military Control 
Officer of ten English Channel ports. Moreover, his recreational pursuits included fishing, shooting 
and 'the field of sports in general.'39 Similarly, B Division's (an investigative department) head, 
Jasper Harker, had spent fourteen years working for the police force in India, before eventually 
rising to become the Deputy Commissioner in Bombay.40  
 
  Within the wider context of the British intelligence community this was par for the course. 
As a result of its central mandate as a cryptanalysis unit, GC&CS primarily relied upon individuals 
with advanced academic training. Nevertheless, social status, unsullied British lineage, and a form 
of intellectual masculinity were the order of the day. One potential recruit despite possessing a 
degree in Classics from Cambridge University, a master of multiple languages including French, 
Modern Greek and Italian, and a background in the Officers' Training Corps, was nevertheless 
deemed an inappropriate choice. The fact that his father was Armenian proved an insurmountable 
hurdle to his appointment.41 Another rejected nominee was initially described as being ‘a very 
promising candidate’, nevertheless, his history of 'nerve weakness' and youth ruined his 
candidacy.42 The dismissal of these two individuals demonstrates how little was required for an 
otherwise high calibre candidate to be deemed inadequate. In these two instances, a fear of enemy 
aliens and the lack of a suitably ‘stiff upper lip’, took precedence over academic qualifications. 
                                                 
35 Ibid, p. 54. 
36 Proctor, Family Ties in the Making of Modern Intelligence, p. 461. 
37 Chris Northcott (2007) The Role, Organisation and Methods of MI5, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 20(3), p. 453. 
38 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 127. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, pp. 127-128. 
41 TNA, HW 72/9, Correspondence between Alastair Denniston and O. V. Guy, 20 April 1932.  
42 TNA, HW 72/9, Correspondence between Alastair Denniston and O. V. Guy, 8 June 1932; 27 June 1932; 2 July 1932. 
  
 From 1909 to 1939, the recruitment of personnel to MI5 revolved heavily around gender, 
social class, education, military credentials and nationality. Male officers were consistently required 
to be of good social stock, possess a classical education, have a military background and conform to 
the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity. That is, that these men reflected the ‘culturally 
exalted’ form of masculinity of their class and period.43 Female candidates, on the other hand, had 
to meet higher educational standards and obtain a recommendation from a suitably socially 
respectable source. These practices were a continuation of the trend set by the initial employment of 
Kell and Cumming in 1909. Sonya Rose notes that the First World War showcased an aggressive 
and militaristic form of hegemonic masculinity which, in the wake of carnage of that conflict, 
dwindled during the interwar period. It was replaced by an ‘anti-heroic masculinity’ until the 
outbreak of the Second World War, which in turn prompted a new form of masculinity to emerge.44 
However, MI5’s recruitment practices show only superficial evidence of this national redrawing of 
hegemonic masculine archetypes during the inter-war period and Second World War; the 
adventurer, sportsman and military veteran continued to dominate the agency. In short, despite the 
national emergency posed by the Second World War and the vast expansion of the agency during 
that conflict, MI5's internal culture would continue to demonstrate remarkable continuity.  
 
Gender and Recruitment in the Second World War 
 
While available records on recruitment to MI5 from the Second World War are fragmentary, 
rendering it more difficult to reach a firm conclusion regarding the necessary expected qualities 
wartime candidates for the various roles within the agency were expected to possess, a clear pattern 
does nevertheless emerge. The emphasis on the masculine qualities required in the pre-Second 
World War period largely continued unabated and was instituted from the top of the organisation 
down. In 1940 Sir David Petrie was appointed as Director General and like his temporary 
predecessor, Harker, had previously built a lengthy career (for which he received a knighthood) in 
the Indian Imperial Police from 1900 to 1936. Specifically, he had worked in the Department of 
Criminal Intelligence, of which he became director in 1924.45 Despite a Master's degree from 
Aberdeen University, Petrie appears not to have been the brightest of officers.46 Ashton Roskill, a 
barrister recruited into the agency shortly after the outbreak of war, doubted if the new Director 
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General possessed 'more than a B+ mind'.47 Petrie did, however, strike a masculine and gentlemanly 
figure. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography describes Petrie as having been 'a powerfully 
built man, with a steady gaze, square jaw, and a military moustache, he was straightforward, firm, 
and decisive, combining a grasp of practical intelligence work with the skills of an unspectacular 
but effective leader.'48 Clearly, the change of leadership in 1940, though placing greater emphasis on 
powers of organisation and management, did not mean taking a cut from radically different cloth. 
The Second World War did, however, bring about one important change; though still not a 
requirement, greater emphasis was placed on university education. The informal networks of these 
educational institutions, as well as the legal profession, proved ideal for the recruitment of those 
with the skills MI5 desired. Indeed, some officers would complain that draining Britain's national 
talent to such an extent was selfish not in the national interest; it would have been better that some 
of these men should have been left to enter other essential wartime professions.49  
  
 The recruitment of agents, on the other hand, was viewed in a somewhat different light. Due 
to the nature of the role, in many cases recruits were selected based on circumstance, as opposed to 
background. Nevertheless, it was thought that each intelligence officer could pick one ‘agent 
worthy’ candidate from within his own circle of friends.50 Maxwell Knight, reputed to be the model 
for James Bond, opined that the 'first consideration for choosing any agent, man or woman, should 
be that the individual in question be a normal, balanced person.'51 Their gender, he contended, did 
not matter and bemoaned 'the very long-standing and ill-founded prejudice against the employment 
of women as agents'.52 However, his first set of wartime recruits did not entirely reflect this 
generous view that women made suitable agents. In fact, of his first recruits only one was a woman, 
the wife of one of the other new recruits. These recruits were: Mr J. Bingham, Captain H. C. 
Brocklehurst, Captain A. Gillison, Captain N. Gladstone and Mrs. N. Gladstone. As well as the 
obvious military ties, both Brocklehurst and Captain Gladstone were fortunate enough to be 
bestowed with 'amazing' and 'immense' numbers of 'personal contacts'. Furthermore, Brocklehurst 
and Gillison possessed 'worldwide experience'. Bingham, despite having no military connections – 
having been rejected by the army as a result of poor eyesight – was a journalist, which gave him the 
relevant analytical qualifications for the task at hand. Mrs Gladstone had an abundance of contacts 
and Knight said of her recruitment, ‘When I first put this scheme forward, I felt that we should have 
to have the assistance of a woman, since experience had already shown me that there are many 
                                                 
47 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 237. 
48 J. Tomes, Petrie. 
49 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 219. 
50 TNA, KV 4/227, Maxwell Knight, Report of the Work of M.S., p. 16. 
51 Ibid, p. 20. 
52 Ibid, p. 19. 
occasions where it is better for a woman rather than a man.’53 Taken together, the various 
characteristics of the agents reveal a now familiar trend. These were well connected, educated, 
upper and middle class individuals who often had a history of military service. 
 
 Nevertheless, intelligence officers were still, however, hesitant to employ women, as they 
feared them too prone to the governance of their passions. In his oft quoted report on recruitment in 
his sub-section, Maxwell Knight recorded that the general view of female agents in MI5 was that 
they 'were less discreet than men: that they were ruled by their emotions, and not by their brains: 
that they rely on intuition rather than on reason; and that Sex [would] play an unsettling and 
dangerous role in their work.'54 Though Knight himself warned against the use of 'over emotional' 
women, he conceded that the alleged female propensity for emotion could actually be useful.  
 
On the other hand, the emotional make-up of a properly balanced woman can very 
often be utilised in investigation; and it is in fact that woman’s intuition is sometimes 
amazingly helpful and amazingly correct has been well established; and given the right 
guiding hand, this ability can at times save an Intelligence Officer an enormous amount of 
trouble.55  
 
Furthermore, female agents were seen to be susceptible to sexual desire. Knight advised that 
female recruits should be neither 'over-sexed nor under sexed', stating that he believed there was 
nothing 'more terrifying than for an officer to become landed with a woman-agent who suffers from 
an overdose of Sex'. Encouraging female agents to engage in sexual intercourse with their targets 
was to be avoided, because 'it is unfortunately the case that if a man is physically but casually 
interested in a woman, he will very speedily lose his interest in her once his immediate object is 
attained'.56 However, he argued that such a situation could be easily avoided by an officer paying 
'particular attention to the types of men that the woman concerned likes or dislikes' when she was 
initially recruited.57 This reluctance to employ an agent who posed a danger of being 'over sexed' 
might perhaps have influenced his decision to recruit the respectably married Mrs. Gladstone.  
 
Of course, it is important to not reductively overstate matters and not all agents conformed to 
Knight's rules for recruitment. For those agents recruited into B.1(A), the section dedicated to the 
‘Double Cross System’, the restrictions of war and the need to seize opportunities overrode other 
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factors such as social standing, connections and nationality. The central idea of Double Cross was 
simple; to identify German agents in Britain, to gain control of them, to learn what the Germans 
were planning, and to use the ‘turned’ agents to feed false information back to Berlin.58 That being 
the case, the candidates were, in effect, supplied by the Abwehr (Germany's foreign intelligence 
service). As such, the kinds of trend outlined above, when intelligence officers had complete control 
over the selection process, obviously does not apply. That said, MI5 did however retain the ultimate 
decision of whether or not the work with these individuals. An instructive example of this is the 
case of the now famous Agent Garbo (Juan Pujol Garcia). A Spaniard from an impoverished family, 
Garbo certainly did not fit the mould of Knight's first four male recruits. His ability, willingness and 
skill in misinforming the enemy were profound, and quickly seized upon by MI5.59 He played an 
integral part of the deception plan, Operation Fortitude, which contributed to the success of the 
Normandy landings on 6 June 1944 by providing false information to the Germans regarding the 
location of the invasion.60  
 
 Interestingly, some similar familiar character traits do nevertheless appear, particularly in the 
case of female agents – perhaps an indicator that some of MI5's preconceptions were shared by the 
Abwehr. As such, the types of women to participate as Double Cross agents tended to be worldly, 
well connected women who travelled in elite circles – often ‘adventuresses’. This is particularly 
evident in the case of Agent Treasure (Nathalie Sergueiew), who was 'regarded as a character well 
suited to becoming a double agent.'61Agent Treasure was born to an elite family in Petrograd in 
1912. Although her initial profession was as a nurse, in the 1930s she became a journalist in Berlin, 
where she was recruited by fellow journalist, Felix Dassel, to work for the German Secret Service.62 
Treasure was sent to Britain via Madrid, where she promptly offered to betray the Germans.63 Once 
across the English Channel MI5 recruited her to work as a double agent. It was decided that a 
relative, who lived in England and worked as a lecturer at Oxford, should be interviewed to provide 
a reference for Treasure’s character. Her cousin, Doctor Hill, stated that Treasure was 'somewhat of 
an adventuress; that she was an exceedingly clever girl, being both a successful artist and a 
journalist.'64 Furthermore, Treasure had been on a walking tour across Europe, on which she wrote 
articles about the various distinguished people to whom she had gained access via her family 
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connections.65  
 
Clearly in Treasure's case, independence, intelligence and courage appear to have been among 
MI5's target characteristics when recruiting agents. Another female agent, codenamed Bronx, 
certainly fitted that mould. The daughter of a Peruvian diplomat, Elvira Concepcion Josefina 
Chaudoir had lived in France until 1939 when she departed for England. Once in London she 
promptly established herself within high society. In 1942 she was sent by MI6, via Lisbon, to Vichy 
France where she was to pass on secret messages to contacts there and she carried out this task 'to 
the best of her ability'.66 While in France she was ‘recruited’ by German intelligence, and in 
exchange for regular payment, was tasked with spying on the British upon her return to England.  
Instead, she was transferred to MI5 and began work as a Double Cross agent.67 In key respects 
Bronx displayed the usual characteristics of female agents. She came from a wealthy educated 
background and travelled in high society, specifically its gambling circuits. She had multiple 
contacts including Lord Carnarvon, who further introduced her to Duff Cooper, the Earl of 
Marlborough, the manager of the American Club, and an individual 'very well in with Russian 
official circles' in Britain.68 These kinds of contacts, with access to international information, were 
naturally of great interest to MI5.  
 
Bronx was not, however, without her problems. She was evidently a gambling addict with 
debts accrued at the Hamilton Club approaching £1,000. Her monthly payments of around £100 
from the Abwehr, borrowing from the bank, an allowance from her father, and generous monies 
from MI5 did not cover these expenses.69 From MI5's perspective, Bronx was, as one internal 
memo described her, 'completely mercenary-minded, a “good-time girl” with no allegiance to 
anyone except herself'. These traits among other factors, limited her value for deception or counter-
intelligence.70 Another memorandum suggested that, although living with a man, had, at least at one 
time, held 'lesbian tendencies' and was 'intelligent but lazy'.71 Indeed, somewhat foolishly, she 
publicly let slip her initial mission for MI6, which was rapidly reported to the authorities. This soon 
led to a flurry of correspondence as various different agencies, including MI5, Special Branch and 
the SOE attempted get to the bottom of who she worked for. Either through error or to keep their 
cards close to their chests, MI6's Kim Philby (himself working in secret for Moscow as a double 
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agent) initially responded to these queries contending that Chaudoir was not employed by them.72 
 
 Clearly then, the trend of employing masculine, upper-class men, who were well-educated 
and had, in many cases, military ties continued during the Second World War. Similarly, women 
were still recruited with caution and had to have a reliable recommendation. In terms of recruiting 
agents, albeit in the case of Double Cross was partly out of MI5s hands, the women in question 
were independent, intelligent, and well connected. The reluctance of MI5 to utilise female agents 
was clearly diminished by the exigencies of war. This emphasis on recruiting well connected, 
exclusively educated men would of course come back to haunt MI5 and the wider intelligence 
community during the Cold War. It transpired that it was precisely these attitudes and 
preconceptions regarding the makings of a high calibre and trustworthy intelligence officer which 
facilitated the recruitment of the notorious Cambridge Five spy-ring, all of whom were recruited by 
the Soviet intelligence services while at Cambridge University. These men would go on, during the 
Second World War, to forge careers at the heart of Britain's secret community. Once in position they 
leaked highly classified and important intelligence secrets to Moscow.73 The culture of the 
intelligence community, it is clear, reflected that of the mandarin and administrative class of the 
civil service, where the school and university tie ruled supreme. Indeed, some 50% of the 
administrative class were drawn from fee-paying or public schools and 85% had attended 
Oxbridge.74 
 
Gender, Work and Expansion 
 
The Second World War saw MI5’s staff numbers grow considerably and the vast majority of 
those new employees were women. The mass recruitment of women into the wartime agency in 
some respects followed wider trends within wartime Britain. As is well understood, the labour crisis 
prompted by the Second World War led to the number of women in the British work force to 
increase by 2.25 million by 1943.75 Indeed, in the context of the wider intelligence community, this 
reliance on female labour was dwarfed by that of GC&CS which employed approximately 6,750 
women at Bletchley Park by December 1944.76 MI6 also saw an increase in the number of female 
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employees during the war years, though, as was largely the case in the other two agencies, they 
were employed only in ‘subordinate roles’.77 Similarly, in the United States America, the Office of 
Strategic Services (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency) came to employ some 4,500 
women.78 The increase in MI5s female staff contingent should not, however, be viewed as a source 
of new opportunity for women in the agency. The agency's consistently prejudicial attitudes towards 
gender ensured that the types of role that women could obtain were highly limited to administrative 
and clerical work. These were, of course, forms of work with which women had become 
increasingly associated since the boom in the financial sector at the beginning of the century and its 
increased requirement for ‘typewriters’.79 Other information intensive organisations within British 
society, not least the civil service which saw a staggering 1,214% increase in female staff, also saw 
an expansion in the number of women staff they employed as a result of heightened wartime 
demands.80  
 
In July 1939, MI5 was comprised of thirty-six officers, a secretarial and Registry staff of 133, 
and in September twenty-nine Security Control officers at ports.81 The outbreak of war necessitated 
a rapid expansion of the agency to meet an explosion in demand for MI5's services. Unsurprisingly, 
during this period men occupied the vast majority of middle and senior managerial roles, such as 
those of department leaders, intelligence officers or agents. As noted, by contrast female staff were 
generally restricted to clerical roles as they had been since 1909; working as secretaries and typists, 
or in the Registry. For instance, as Table 1 shows, of 360 officers within the agency in October 
1943, 327 were male.82 They were supported by forty-nine male clerical assistants, thirty-nine less 
senior women devoid of officer status, and 917 'Female others' – clerical staff and auxiliary rank 
and file.83 The exclusion of women of officer status from intelligence roles suggests that during the 
Second World War women were still treated with caution, trusted far less than men and deemed 
unsuited to work which required advanced analytical skills and decision making.  
 
Table 1. MI5 Staff Numbers, August 1941 – October 1943 
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Aug-41 80 49 177 48 21 30 801 
Jan-42 95 55 175 51 23 32 877 
Apr-42 95 58 178 51 27 33 907 
Jul-42 94 61 175 53 31 35 880 
Dec-42 103 62 168 51 34 38 867 
Oct-43 109 65 153 49 33 39 829 
Source: TNA, KV 4/156, Table – Functions: Summary of All. 
 
Administrative staff lists from throughout the entire interwar period demonstrate that the 
positions of directors were consistently filled by male staff members while the heads of the agency's 
six divisions were predominantly military men.84  Women, however, were excluded from these 
higher positions, even though they had the relevant experience. To return to the case of Jane Archer, 
she was recruited as a clerk in 1916 and was then promoted to head of the Registry in 1922. Despite 
working in MI5 for 23 years, she was never promoted above her middle tier role as an officer of a 
sub-section within a sub-division.85 In the wider context of the British intelligence community as a 
whole, the typical route for a woman to reach officer status was via promotion to a position of 
seniority and responsibility over other women. Meanwhile, at GC&CS, with few exceptions, 
women were primarily restricted to clerical work and machine operation.86 This was equally a 
consistent trend in the delegation of lower-ranking intelligence officers throughout the divisions of 
MI5 at this time. Whilst men were not only prevalent in the roles of division directors, they also 
made up all of the roles of sub-division directors, except for the Registry and Finance sub-divisions 
in A Division, and were again the majority of sub-section officers in 1939.87  
 
Table 2. Delegation of ‘Female Officers’ 
Section Date      
 Aug-41 Jan-42 Apr-42 Jul-42 Dec-42 Oct-43 
Director General Staff - - - - 1 2 
Administration - - - - - - 
Registry - - - - - - 
Overseas Staff - - - - - 2 
Regional Staff - - - - - - 
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B: Counterespionage 7 7 9 11 12 10 
C: Credentials 1 1 1 1 1 - 
D.1, D.2, D.3 & D.C & D88 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D.4 (Headquarters only) - 1 2 2 2 - 
E: Alien Control 5 5 6 7 7 5 
F: Subversive Movements 7 8 8 9 10 12 
TNA, KV 4/156, Five Tables on Women Staff. 
 
The treatment of Archer is suggestive of the delegation of work to, and treatment of, women 
in MI5 at this time. Whilst Masterman wrote that personnel in MI5 during the war were 'a team of 
congenial people who worked together harmoniously and unselfishly, and among whom rank 
counted for little', this was clearly not true in Archer’s case.89 Moreover, as highlighted above, 
Christopher Andrew notes that 'No other woman was given officer rank for the remainder of the 
war, even if a substantial number performed officers' jobs.'90 Furthermore, he suggests that 
fragmentary evidence indicates that, in the wake of Archer’s sacking, a new regulation was 
implemented in 1941, which made it impossible for women to be promoted to officer rank in the 
future.  Yet as the data in Table 1 demonstrates, the number of women described as ‘officers’ on 
MI5s books increased from 21 to 33 between August 1941 and October 1943. However, MI5’s 
tables of the numbers of staff delegated across various departments of the agency (some data from 
which is compiled in Table 2), list these female employees (officers or otherwise) under the 
category of 'Female Clerical Assist[ant]s'. Clearly these ‘officers’ were supervising the other women 
engaged in clerical or auxiliary roles.91 Two apparent possibilities suggest themselves to resolve this 
contradiction. First, it appears entirely plausible that women were restricted from officer status in 
the male sphere of intelligence gathering and analysis. That is, they could not become intelligence 
officers. However, this did not preclude female staff from obtaining ‘officer’ roles in white collar 
‘women's work’. Second, and related to the first point, the women listed as ‘officers’ might not have 
held the formal status within the agency, but they did hold authority, engaged in work tantamount to 
that of an officer and the word was utilised for convenience.   
 
Table 3: Delegation of ‘Female Others’ 
Section Date      
 Aug-41 Jan-42 Apr-42 Jul-42 Dec-42 Oct-43 
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Certainly, MI5 had a history of referring to women who had the role and responsibility of an 
officer but not the actual rank, as was the case of the management of Registry during the First 
World War.93 Moreover, lists of section leaders in A Division, which included the Registry, in 1939 
named female section and sub-section leaders whereas no female officers were listed in the Registry 
in tables from August 1941 and October 1943.94 Rather than a wholesale purge of A Division's 
middle management, it appears that the word ‘officer’ was utilised interchangeably to indicate status 
rather than rank.  
 
As noted above, the majority of women were restricted to clerical roles, and as Table 3 
shows the majority distributed around the various sections of the agency with the Registry 
absorbing the largest number. As there appear to be no personal files available on the clerical staff 
of MI5 during the war, what is known about the clerical workers can only be seen in staff lists and 
staff reviews. These summaries record, as Table 1 and Table 3 indicate, male clerical staff 
performed only a fraction of this work. Meanwhile, after Petrie became MI5s Director General, the 
female-dominated Registry was mechanised in order 'to be', as one staff member put it, 'something 
like Ford's factory where each worker had one job to do'.  95 This clear reference to Henry Ford’s car 
factories, in this instance, demonstrated a wartime shift to industrial management of information 
processing – data was placed onto a production line.96 The result was that the staff endured a loss of 
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responsibility, where, prior to 1940, they had enjoyed some degree of personal latitude in their 
work. Under Kell’s Directorship, the Registry staff required a specialised knowledge of their 
specific subject, especially those in positions of leadership; after its revamping this was diminished. 
 
Moreover, the changes implemented under Petrie’s Directorship also required that the heads 
of sections no longer dealt with disparate subjects and responsibility for decisions regarding sorting 
and extracting information were transferred to officers within the relevant divisions. This meant that 
Registry staff were no longer required to have specialised knowledge97 as they were now 
responsible for far simpler tasks, including filing and indexing.98 The changes were clearly 
necessary given the situation. Prior to the outbreak of war the section had been understaffed and 
under resourced, yet with the onset of war its workload increased far beyond its ability to manage.99  
However, the changes in responsibility also implied that the Registry staff were no longer to be 
trusted with such specialised tasks, which led to bitter complaints.100 Of course, if viewed in another 
light, the collapse of the Registry is revelatory; the lack of interest shown in the Registry – 
‘women's work’ – by MI5's male elites, forced a minor industrial revolution within the agency when 
it was ‘tested’ by war. The result being that MI5 was indeed made more efficient and passed its test, 
but that women who were not responsible for the Registry's malaise saw their roles downgraded in 




This examination of the recruitment, role and perception of women in MI5, though primarily 
concerned with the Second World War, reveals results which tend to conform to the bulk of the 
scholarship to address the role of women in wartime Britain over the last three decades. Studies of 
women in Britain's wartime Home Front, broadly since the 1980s, have presented the war as a 
period which demonstrated considerable continuity with earlier developments in the century. Penny 
Summerfield contended in 1984 that, 'in spite of challenge and expectation', the war was 
characterised by familiar 'pre-war attitudes and practices towards women' and that this was 
'considerable in the areas of both domestic work and paid employment.'101 While the domestic 
duties of women in the intelligence services in wartime Britain has yet to be explored, such a study 
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is beyond the scope of a single article. However, this study does confirm that, in the case of MI5, 
there was indeed little change with regards to attitudes towards gender, from its foundations in 1909 
to 1945. Meanwhile, recruitment trends, which highlight the significance of nationality and social 
class, similarly tend to corroborate Sonya Rose's conclusion, that wartime efforts to promote 
national unity hid significant underlying tensions.102  
 
Isolated from wider society by a thick veil of secrecy and fear of infiltration, this agency 
which from its creation, founded as it was by military men with ties to the aristocracy, reflected a 
rarefied form of early twentieth century British hegemonic masculinity. Those women employed 
tended to be from elite backgrounds; gentlewomen with an elite education and good social 
connections, suggestive perhaps of a form of ‘hegemonic femininity’; an idealised archetype of 
middle and upper-class womanhood. Juliette Pattinson, in her discussion of female SOE agents, 
utilises the term ‘dominant femininity’ and avoids the term ‘hegemonic’. This is because the modes 
of feminine behaviour performed by SOE agents, operating behind enemy lines, were specifically 
designed to avoid arousing potentially fatal suspicion.103 Such a qualification in the case of MI5 is 
unnecessary; the agency’s female employees and agents were rarely, if ever, called upon to pass 
unnoticed in occupied Europe. Instead, MI5’s ideal female employee was required to hold ‘exalted’ 
feminine traits; she needed to be capable, reliable and well educated. She was also of sufficiently 
high social status that her patriotism and good character could be taken for granted, and, unlike Jane 
Archer, she showed proper deference to male authority. There was little impetus or opportunity for 
divergence from these established internal cultural norms over the first two decades of the agency's 
existence, in spite of the pressures of the First World War. Though the number of women employed 
by the agency did increase massively during that conflict, their roles were near universally restricted 
to auxiliary and clerical work. A very few women within MI5 did gain positions of authority, but 
that was, with the exception of perhaps only Jane Archer, restricted in the vast majority of cases to 
authority over other women conducting work deemed socially permissible for women.  Even 
compared to GC&CS, the only British intelligence agency in the Second World War to have been 
systematically analysed in regards to gender, MI5’s delegation of work to women was profoundly 
restrictive.  
 
Interestingly, an examination of wartime MI5 provides an opportunity to revisit Arthur 
Marwick's familiar, if dated, ‘Four Dimensions’ thesis.104 The war brought with it considerable 
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it always had been. Indeed, if the treatment of Jane Archer and the reconfiguration of the Registry 
are indicative, the status of women in the wartime agency actually declined as a result of the war.  
MI5 might have modernised and passed the test of war, but in doing so there was little change in the 
psychological attitude towards women, gender, social class or nationality. In terms of the 
recruitment of female agents, even individuals like Maxwell Knight, who, despite wider agency 
attitudes, claimed to have always believed that women had an important part to play in secret work. 
Yet the acceptance of women in this masculine world was only tolerable if it conformed to 
established ideas regarding femininity and social status: female agents should be carefully chosen to 
ensure that they were not burdened by an emotional state of mind or be 'over-sexed'. Where they 
were useful, Knight concluded, lay in traditional feminine qualities such as the possession of 
‘women's intuition’. The challenge of war did not shake pre-existing understandings of masculinity, 
femininity and social status; it further confirmed them.  
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